Bank ownership structure, lending corruption and the regulatory environment

Abstract : We empirically examine whether bank lending corruption is in uenced by the ownership structure of banks, a country's regulatory environment and its level of economic development. We nd that corruption in lending is higher when state- owned banks or family-owned banks provide a higher proportion of credit to the economy, in both developed and developing countries. A stronger regulatory environment, either through a stronger supervisory regime or a higher quality of external audits, helps to curtail bank lending corruption if induced by family- controlled ownership, but not if induced by state-controlled ownership. We further nd that controlled-ownership of banks by other banks contributes to reduce corruption in lending; the same applies to widely-held ownership of banks, but only for developed countries
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-unilim.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01204938
Contributeur : Thierno Barry <>
Soumis le : jeudi 24 septembre 2015 - 16:51:54
Dernière modification le : mercredi 28 février 2018 - 17:06:02

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01204938, version 1

Collections

Citation

Thierno Amadou Barry, Laetitia Lepetit, Frank Strobel. Bank ownership structure, lending corruption and the regulatory environment. Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, 2016, pp.732-751. ⟨hal-01204938⟩

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

213