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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Comparative Economics Année : 2016

Bank ownership structure, lending corruption and the regulatory environment

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Résumé

We empirically examine whether bank lending corruption is in uenced by the ownership structure of banks, a country's regulatory environment and its level of economic development. We nd that corruption in lending is higher when state- owned banks or family-owned banks provide a higher proportion of credit to the economy, in both developed and developing countries. A stronger regulatory environment, either through a stronger supervisory regime or a higher quality of external audits, helps to curtail bank lending corruption if induced by family- controlled ownership, but not if induced by state-controlled ownership. We further nd that controlled-ownership of banks by other banks contributes to reduce corruption in lending; the same applies to widely-held ownership of banks, but only for developed countries
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Dates et versions

hal-01204938 , version 1 (24-09-2015)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01204938 , version 1

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Thierno Amadou Barry, Laetitia Lepetit, Frank Strobel. Bank ownership structure, lending corruption and the regulatory environment. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2016, 44, pp.732-751. ⟨hal-01204938⟩

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