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, Our five dependant variables are Zscore the natural logarithm of the measure of the bank default risk and financial stability ; Zscore1 is the natural logarithm of the measure of bank asset risk ; Zscore2 is the natural logarithm of the measure of bank leverage risk ; SDROA is the standard deviation of the return on assets on a threeyear rolling window ; ROA is the return on assets that measures profitability as the ratio of net income to total assets. Foreign: dummy equal to one when the bank owns at least one affiliate abroad and zero otherwise ; Nb_Affiliates: natural logarithm of the total number of foreign affiliates owned by a bank Nb_S: natural logarithm of the number of foreign subsidiaries owned by a bank, ) regarding the effects of bank foreign affiliates complexity on bank risk and profitability over the 2011-2013 period

, EQ_TA: Equity to total assets, measure of leverage/bank capitalization ; IncomeDivers: measure of income diversification !"#$%&'()&*+ = 1 ? / 012 45216172 4589:1;<2=16 <>16?2@5A 458951 B92?C <>16?2@95A 4589:1 / ; CIR: Cost to income ratio ; Deposits_TA: Customer deposits and short-term funding to total assets ; Loans_TA: Net loans to total assets

, Restrictions is the index of the restrictiveness in the participation into bank activities such as securities, insurance, real estate and the ownership power in nonfinancial firms ; RegulCapital is an index of the stringency of the requirements in terms of minimum capital adequacy, risk and market value losses, sources of funding used to capitalize a bank and the level of official appraisal ; Supervision is the measure of the official power in all actions taken by the authorities to prevent and correct problems regarding auditing, internal/board/ownership rights structure, profits and losses and other balance sheets items ; GDP growth is the growth rate of the real gross domestic product; Concentration is the proportion of assets held by the three largest banks in a country over the total assets of the banking sector ; LegalStrength measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. We use the Hausman-Taylor specification with a clustering at the bank-level to estimate the ten equations of our model. Variables were winsorized at 1% and 99% levels to limit the influence of extreme values and the table reports robust standard errors in parentheses and the significance of p-value by *, Coop: dummy equal to one if the bank has a "Cooperative" banking specialization ; Savg: dummy equal to one if the bank has a "Savings" banking specialization

/. Burma, . Myanmar, and . Cambodia,

C. Polynesia,

H. Kong, ;. Indonesia-;-japan, ;. Korea, ;. Lao, P. Macau et al., New Zealand ; Philippines

. Thailand-;-timor-leste, Vanuatu ; Vietnam ; Wallis and Futuna Number of EU banks with foreign activity -26

, Number of foreign affiliates -226 Number of foreign subsidiaries -81 Number of foreign branches -145

, Europe (EUR), p.44

;. Albania and . Andorra,

, Austria (EU)

H. Bosnia,

. Croatia,

, Cyprus (EU)

. Denmark,

. Estonia,

. Finland,

. France,

(. Germany and . Eu)-;-gibraltar,

. Hungary,

. Ireland,

(. Italy and . Eu)-;-kosovo,

, Latvia (EU) ; Liechtenstein

. Luxembourg,

. Macedonia,

(. Malta, ;. Eu)-;-moldova, and . Montenegro,

. Poland,

. Portugal,

, Romania (EU

, San Marino ; Serbia

. Slovenia,

. Spain,

(. Sweden, ;. Eu)-;-switzerland, ;. Turkey, and . Ukraine,

;. Angola, ;. Botswana-;-burkina-faso, ;. Burundi-;-cameroon-;-cape-verde, ;. Chad, and . Congo,

R. Congo and . Dem,

, Equatorial Guinea ; Ethiopia ; Gabon ; Gambia ; Ghana ; Guinea

;. Guinea-bissau-;-kenya-;-madagascar, ;. Malawi, and . Mali,

P. Mauritania-;-mauritius-;-mozambique-;-nigeria-;-rwanda-;-sao-tome and . Seychelles,