Do Asymmetric Information and Ownership Structure Matter for Dividend Payout Decisions? Evidence from European Banks

Laetitia Lepetit (1) , Céline Meslier-Crouzille (1) , Leo Indra Wardhana (1)

1 LAPE - Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Prospective Economique

We empirically examine whether banks' dividend decisions are influenced by their degree of opacity and ownership structure. We find that banks with concentrated or dispersed ownership structure pay lower dividends when they have high degrees of opacity. These results would be consistent with the entrenchment behavior hypothesis, with insiders (managers or majority shareholders) paying lower dividends to extract higher levels of private benefits when banks' opacity is high. Higher levels of shareholder protection and stronger supervisory regimes help to constrain entrenchment behavior of majority shareholders. Our findings have critical policy implications for the Basel 3 implementation of restrictions on dividend payouts.

Mots clés: Bank; dividend; ownership concentration; asymmetric information

Domaines: Sciences de l'Homme et Société; Economies et finances

Laetitia Lepetit, Céline Meslier-Crouzille, Leo Indra Wardhana. Do Asymmetric Information and Ownership Structure Matter for Dividend Payout Decisions? Evidence from European Banks. 2015. ⟨hal-01186722⟩